Two covert influence operations, one from Russia and one from Iran, used ChatGPT not to invent new tactics but to speed up old ones. That is the central finding of a new OpenAI threat report, which describes banning both networks after tracing how they built false-front entities to push geopolitical, conflict-related messaging into target audiences.
The report frames the activity as a return to pre-AI playbooks. The Iranian network’s personas resemble “Alice Donovan,” a front for Russian military intelligence whose articles appeared in Western outlets in 2016-17. The Russian network’s use of unwitting staff mirrors “PeaceData,” a fake outlet run in 2020 by individuals linked to the Internet Research Agency.
Why These Covert Influence Operations Stand Out
The difference lies in reach. On the IO Breakout Scale, which rates operations from 1 to 6, the Russian network was assessed at Category 5, the first such operation disrupted since the reporting began. The Iranian network reached Category 4. Both placed content in mainstream outlets rather than relying only on social media.
This fits a wider pattern across 30 covert influence operations exposed over two and a half years: networks that land content in real media outlets tend to achieve the highest potential reach and impact.
Dark Clark: Russia’s Front Think Tank in Latin America
The Russian network, nicknamed Dark Clark, targeted Latin America, largely to undermine Ukraine’s reputation and, in some cases, to influence politics in Argentina and Bolivia. Operators accessed ChatGPT through VPNs and used it mainly to write internal reports for an unknown superior.
They controlled a self-described research platform, the Social Research Center, through a fake persona named “Mia Clark.” Evidence indicates its Latin American staff did not know they worked for a Russian group. The site carried well over 60 articles, most of them original.
Several fakes gained traction. Operators claimed they sent a fake email, appearing to come from Lima’s education authority, prompting schools to hold Ukraine-themed events referencing Stepan Bandera. Matching stories appeared in Peruvian and Polish media, drawing comment from a Polish Member of the European Parliament. A fake contract alleging Ecuadorians were being recruited for Ukraine triggered a fact check, and fake audio about water cuts in La Paz prompted an official denial from the state water company EPSAS.
The operators also took credit for events they had no role in, suggesting an attempt to influence their own employers.
Bogus Bylines: Iran’s Fake Journalist Personas
The Iranian network, called Bogus Bylines, used seven fake journalist personas to pitch long-form articles on the US-Iran conflict to small and medium online outlets. Almost 100 articles appeared across more than a dozen publications between July 2025 and October 2026, with output rising sharply after the conflict began. One outlet had almost 2 million Facebook followers.
Its social media commenting fared worse. Batches of replies drew single or double-digit engagement, earning a Category 2 rating. Internal reports measured success using views on the posts they replied to, not the replies themselves, which greatly inflated their apparent impact.
The report notes that AI can give false-front networks greater scale, efficiency, linguistic fluency, and editorial ability, helping them exploit unsuspecting editors and employees. Yet secrecy is also their weakness. Both “Alice Donovan” and “PeaceData” stopped after exposure, and the report states its disclosures aim to make further research and disruption easier. Information on both cases has been shared with relevant authorities.
